The Borda Rule, the Condorcet Criterion, and the Intensity of Preferences: A Reconciliation through the Maskin’s Modified Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

Due to its failure to meet the Condorcet criterion, the Borda count has historically been widely criticized. This study challenges that criticism by arguing that Borda’s divergence from Condorcet reflects the strength of preferences rather than a mere defect. The goal is to show that the Borda count is the only option that can balance the strength of individual preferences with majority rule when reexamined using Eric Maskin’s axiomatic framework. This article reinterprets Arrow’s well-known axiom using a theoretical and axiomatic approach by applying Maskin’s Modified Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (MIIA) axiom. The difference between a Condorcet winner and the Borda count is also demonstrated mathematically. According to our research, the Borda count is the only social welfare function that satisfies these axioms.