Household Register Fraud and Institutional Reform: The Contest between Examination Equity and Regional Equity in Qing Imperial Examinations

This study investigates Household Register Fraud in Imperial Examinations (HRFIE) and its institutional mechanisms within the Qing examination system, building upon Liu Xiwei’s foundational research. The analysis reveals how the Quota-Allocation-by-Region system and Native-Place Testing Principle, while designed to balance educational opportunities and maintain stability, paradoxically stimulated HRFIE through regional quota disparities, population mobility, and stringent registration constraints. The research identifies three primary HRFIE modalities: Cross-Regional Fraud (exploiting inter-provincial quota variations), Status Fraud (misrepresenting privileged household classifications), and Migrant Fraud (circumventing residential requirements). These practices stemmed from structural vulnerabilities, socioeconomic incentives, and mobility demands. Despite implementing candidate verification processes, examiner recusal systems, and progressive policy modifications, the persistence of HRFIE necessitated ongoing systemic negotiations between Examination Equity (meritocratic ideals) and Regional Equity (geographical representation), culminating in adaptive measures like the Non-Native Testing Policy.