The Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Theory and the Lugbara Concept of Virtue

Human life can be said to rotate around ethical concerns. The day to day actions performed by rational beings are moral actions that call for accountability. Ethically responsible actions are either praiseworthy or blameworthy and their natural orientation is towards the good as an end. Actions that tend to the good are described as virtuous, while actions that tend to the bad are vicious. At the center of virtue stands the good that becomes a habitus of a person. This paper argues that virtue as a category of ethical theory is founded on the good both in Aristotelian sense and among the Lugbara. Aristotle, also known as “the father of character”, promotes ardently virtue ethics as the ethics of the mean. His is the ethics of balance, ethics of avoiding extremes and deficiencies in any action. The Lugbara of Uganda equally have a similar version of ethics of the mean. Influenced by their cultural norms, virtue is the focus of good living among the Lugbara in relation to others and oneself. A virtuous person in the Lugbara understanding is one who manages to balance life particularly in the family and the society in general. This paper thus seeks to isolate points of convergence and divergence in the understanding of virtue ethics by Aristotle and the Lugbara of Uganda