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The Effect of Executive Compensation on Financial Performance in Egypt

DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1105760, PP. 1-14

Subject Areas: Managerial Economics, Financial Reporting

Keywords: Board Independence, Executive Compensation, Firm Financial Performance, ROA, Egypt

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Abstract

The current research aims to propose a framework of the effects of Executive Compensation on Financial Performance, measuring the size of effect, the circumstances under which the effect is clearly observed and studying the weighted effect of Executive Compensation on the Performance of firms; ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q turning out with the outcome emphasizing whether the Executive Compensation has a significant or an insignificant role. The research sample is the top listed 50 companies in the Egyptian market which are collected as secondary data from Egypt Stock Exchange. The contribution in this research arises from measuring executive compensation role in firms of Egypt. The research tackles the whole status of the firms in Egypt during the period from 2012 to 2017. Results showed that the main hypothesis of this research that, Executive Compensation on Firm Performance is partially supported.

Cite this paper

Adam, M. A. , Youssef, A. and Sakr, A. M. (2019). The Effect of Executive Compensation on Financial Performance in Egypt. Open Access Library Journal, 6, e5760. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1105760.

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