This paper takes the state-owned manufacturing mixed-ownership en-terprises as the research sample, selects the data from 2014-2016, and studies the relationship between executive equity incentives and corporate growth. Firstly, theoretical analysis is carried out according to the existing literature, and then empirical research is carried out by regression analysis on the basis of theoretical analysis. The research shows that: in the state-owned manufacturing industry, in mixed ownership enterprises, there is a positive correlation between executive equity incentives and corporate growth, but this correlation will be affected by equity concentration. Only when the ratio of the largest shareholder is in the range of 20% - 50%, the positive correlation between executive equity incentives and corporate growth is significant. The executive equity incentive policy has not significantly promoted the growth of the company in the enterprises with scattered equity or excessive concentration of equity. Based on this, it is proposed that enterprises should establish a reasonable executive equity incentive policy and further optimize the shareholding structure through the reform of state-owned enterprise mixed ownership.
Cite this paper
Wang, X. and Liang, H. (2019). Equity Incentive and Growth of Executives in Mixed Ownership Enterprises Listed Manufacturing Enterprises Based on State-Owned Holdings. Open Access Library Journal, 6, e5309. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/oalib.1105309.
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