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EU Coordination Weaknesses: Transaction Costs

DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1102800, PP. 1-16

Subject Areas: Political Economy

Keywords: Models of Regionalism, Coordination Mechanisms, Open and Closed Regionalism, Transaction Costs

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Both the Euroland and the EURO projects face increasing scepticism from several member states as well as nationalist movements. The call for economic reforms augmenting flexibility and work zest in EU member states meets resistance, as it poses threats to the specific European welfare state. The management of the great refugee crisis has led to fundamental questioning of the concept of “Europeanisation” as the commitment of the EU to humanitarian goals and universal human rights. Where lays the basic weakness of the inefficient and bureacratic European model of regional integration? Reply: Transaction costs.

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Lane, J. (2016). EU Coordination Weaknesses: Transaction Costs. Open Access Library Journal, 3, e2800. doi:


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