Vivencia de palabras, significado secundario y poesía: Sobre la idea de un lenguaje propiamente humano en Wittgenstein

between 1946 and 1949, having concluded his long-term work on the first part of philosophical investigations (1929-1945), wittgenstein repeatedly comes to deal with topics related to two notions he coined as ？experience of a word？ (worterlebnis) and ？se-condary meaning？ (sekund？re bedeutung). the present article has the following objectives: to expose, distinguish and interrelate the expressions ？experience of a word？ (or ？experience of meaning？) and ？secondary meaning？ (sections 2, 3 and 4); to question a dominant interpretation according to which the so called ？meaning-blindness？ (bedeutungsblindheit) amounts to the incapacity to perceive the subtleties of poetic language and to suggest alternatively that the author is pointing to the idea of a speciically human language (sections 5 and 6); to clarify the relation between secondary meaning and metaphor (section 7); and to explain what can all this mean with respect to poetry as a language game (section 8).