%0 Journal Article
%T Vivencia de palabras, significado secundario y poes¨ªa: Sobre la idea de un lenguaje propiamente humano en Wittgenstein
%A Fermandois
%A Eduardo
%J Aisthesis
%D 2011
%I Scientific Electronic Library Online
%R 10.4067/S0718-71812011000100014
%X between 1946 and 1949, having concluded his long-term work on the first part of philosophical investigations (1929-1945), wittgenstein repeatedly comes to deal with topics related to two notions he coined as £¿experience of a word£¿ (worterlebnis) and £¿se-condary meaning£¿ (sekund£¿re bedeutung). the present article has the following objectives: to expose, distinguish and interrelate the expressions £¿experience of a word£¿ (or £¿experience of meaning£¿) and £¿secondary meaning£¿ (sections 2, 3 and 4); to question a dominant interpretation according to which the so called £¿meaning-blindness£¿ (bedeutungsblindheit) amounts to the incapacity to perceive the subtleties of poetic language and to suggest alternatively that the author is pointing to the idea of a speciically human language (sections 5 and 6); to clarify the relation between secondary meaning and metaphor (section 7); and to explain what can all this mean with respect to poetry as a language game (section 8).
%K experiencing (the meaning of) a word
%K secondary meaning (or secondary sense)
%K meaning-blindness
%K human language
%K mother tongue
%K poetry.
%U http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S0718-71812011000100014&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en