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考虑“代排”现象的服务系统各参与方效用分析
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Abstract:
“代排”作为一种通过付费购买排队位置以节省时间的新兴商业模式,已在诸多服务场景中普及,但其对服务系统各参与方的复杂影响尚未明晰。本文聚焦于“代排人”主动进入线下队列并转售位置的典型模式,通过离散事件仿真方法构建了考虑顾客策略性行为的排队模型,克服了传统解析模型在刻画复杂交互行为上的局限性。通过模拟不同供需场景,系统分析了“代排”对社会福利和顾客组成的综合影响,并进一步探讨了代排方的最优定价与规模决策机制。研究结果表明,在供不应求时,“代排”通过缓解资源错配能够有效提升社会福利。同时,代排方的定价与规模决策均存在明确的最优点。研究结论为代排方的运营决策、服务提供商的资源配置以及相关政策的制定提供了理论依据与管理启示。
As an emerging business model that allows individuals to pay to secure queue positions and save time, “line-sitting” has become widespread across various service scenarios. However, its complex effects on all participants in service systems remain unclear. This study focuses on a typical form of line-sitting where line-sitters proactively join physical queues and resell their spots to interested customers on-site. To overcome the limitations of traditional analytical models in capturing complex interactions, a discrete-event simulation approach is adopted to construct a queuing model that incorporates strategic customer behavior under the line-sitting mechanism. By simulating different supply-demand scenarios, the study systematically analyzes the comprehensive impact of line-sitting on social welfare and customer composition, and further investigates the optimal pricing and scale decisions for line-sitters. The results show that under conditions of excess demand, line-sitting can effectively improve social welfare by alleviating resource misallocation. Moreover, there exist clear optimal points for both pricing and operational scale in line-sitting activities. The findings provide theoretical support and managerial insights for line-sitters’ operational decisions, service providers’ resource allocation, and the formulation of relevant policies.
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