反垄断法视角下的电商平台自我优待分析
Analysis of Self-Preferential Treatment of E-Commerce Platforms under the Perspective of Antitrust Law

电商平台的运营模式对国民经济产生了深远影响，它们之间的跨界竞争不仅在激烈争夺消费者，还在不断拓展市场边界，而在这一过程中也滋生了竞争失序问题，这其中突出的是一些电商平台身兼经营者与管理者双重角色，频繁采取自我优待策略，以巩固自身市场地位。基于市场杠杆理论并结合实际情况分析，这种自我优待现象应受到反垄断法律框架的约束。根据我国现行《反垄断法》，对这类行为最直接的规制手段似乎是滥用市场支配地位条款。然而，自我优待与差别待遇、搭售、拒绝交易等行为虽有交集，但其复杂性意味着单纯套用滥用市场支配地位条款并不恰当。因此，需要引入合理原则，通过分类法对自我优待行为进行规制。
The mode of operation of e-commerce platforms has had a far-reaching impact on the national economy, and cross-border competition among them has not only fiercely competed for consumers but also continuously expanded market boundaries, but this process has also given rise to the problem of competitive disorder. In particular, some e-commerce platforms play the dual roles of operator and manager, and frequently adopt the strategy of self-preferential treatment in order to consolidate their market position. Based on the theory of market leverage and analyzing the actual situation, this kind of self-preferential phenomenon should be regulated by the antitrust legal framework. According to China’s current “Antimonopoly Law”, the most direct means to regulate such behavior seems to be the abuse of dominant market position clause. However, although self-preferential treatment intersects with differential treatment, tying and refusal to deal, its complexity means that it is not appropriate to simply apply the abuse of dominant position clause. Therefore, there is a need to introduce the principle of reasonableness and to regulate self-preferential behavior through a taxonomy.