The Borders and Limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī’s Thought -In the Context of Controversial Origins (a？l)-

Unlike Hanafī jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiyās is permissible (jā？iz) for the origins (a？l) in which the qiyās rule is invalid, including ruhsat (permission); kaffarah (expiation) and ？add (penalties). Shāfi？ī jurists, Imam al-Shāfi？ī and his followers like al-Juwaynī, argue that Hanafī jurists are contradictory since they apply qiyās in many cases despite their judgment that qiyās is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiyās format. Nevertheless, Shāfi？ī jurists persist that they rule on the qiyās applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinbāt) such as Islamic juristic preference (isti？sān), even beyond qiyās. In his sense of search effective cause: ？illa (ta？lil), al-Juwaynī focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (munāsaba). He runs the mechanism of ta？lil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (munāsaba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the qiyās’ rule is invalid. Kaffarah and ？add consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiyās. Al-Juwaynī’s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for qiyās. In this paper, the aim of study is to identify the borders and limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī’s thought with discussions about the disagreements between the jurists in the specified areas. Summary: As a general principle, devoting (ta？abbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Imām al-Shāfi？ī and reasoning (ta？aqqul/ta？līl) for Abu Hanīfa. Despite this, Abu Hanīfa and Hanafī jurists consider non-qiyās foundations (ma’dul bih ‘anil-qiyās) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddarāt/taqdīrat) and ruhsat (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and ？add (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiyās) and profess that qiyās cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is ta？aqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiyās. On the contrary to their general approach, Shāfi？ī jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to qiyās. Al-Imām al-Shāfi？ī and one of his followers, al-Juwaynī, describe that Hanafī jurists’ applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinbāt) (e.g. juristic preference: isti？sān), furthering qiyās although they take qiyās as illicit in