%0 Journal Article
%T The Borders and Limitations of qiy¨¡s in al-Juwayn¨©¡¯s Thought -In the Context of Controversial Origins (a£¿l)-
%A Mehmet Macit Sevgili
%J -
%D 2019
%X Unlike Hanaf¨© jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiy¨¡s is permissible (j¨¡£¿iz) for the origins (a£¿l) in which the qiy¨¡s rule is invalid, including ruhsat (permission); kaffarah (expiation) and £¿add (penalties). Sh¨¡fi£¿¨© jurists, Imam al-Sh¨¡fi£¿¨© and his followers like al-Juwayn¨©, argue that Hanaf¨© jurists are contradictory since they apply qiy¨¡s in many cases despite their judgment that qiy¨¡s is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiy¨¡s format. Nevertheless, Sh¨¡fi£¿¨© jurists persist that they rule on the qiy¨¡s applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinb¨¡t) such as Islamic juristic preference (isti£¿s¨¡n), even beyond qiy¨¡s. In his sense of search effective cause: £¿illa (ta£¿lil), al-Juwayn¨© focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (mun¨¡saba). He runs the mechanism of ta£¿lil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (mun¨¡saba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the qiy¨¡s¡¯ rule is invalid. Kaffarah and £¿add consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiy¨¡s. Al-Juwayn¨©¡¯s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for qiy¨¡s. In this paper, the aim of study is to identify the borders and limitations of qiy¨¡s in al-Juwayn¨©¡¯s thought with discussions about the disagreements between the jurists in the specified areas. Summary: As a general principle, devoting (ta£¿abbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Im¨¡m al-Sh¨¡fi£¿¨© and reasoning (ta£¿aqqul/ta£¿l¨©l) for Abu Han¨©fa. Despite this, Abu Han¨©fa and Hanaf¨© jurists consider non-qiy¨¡s foundations (ma¡¯dul bih ¡®anil-qiy¨¡s) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddar¨¡t/taqd¨©rat) and ruhsat (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and £¿add (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiy¨¡s) and profess that qiy¨¡s cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is ta£¿aqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiy¨¡s. On the contrary to their general approach, Sh¨¡fi£¿¨© jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to qiy¨¡s. Al-Im¨¡m al-Sh¨¡fi£¿¨© and one of his followers, al-Juwayn¨©, describe that Hanaf¨© jurists¡¯ applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinb¨¡t) (e.g. juristic preference: isti£¿s¨¡n), furthering qiy¨¡s although they take qiy¨¡s as illicit in
%K £¿slam hukuku
%K Cuveyn£¿
%K Burhan
%K £¿£¿yas
%K £¿£¿yastan ma¡®d£¿l a£¿£¿l
%K ru£¿£¿at
%K keffaret
%K £¿add
%U http://dergipark.org.tr/cuid/issue/43612/519657