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面对损失厌恶顾客的零售商订货定价策略及激励问题研究

DOI: 10.13195/j.kzyjc.2012.1401, PP. 107-112

Keywords: 顾客损失厌恶,订货策略,定价策略,补偿契约,激励问题

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Abstract:

考虑顾客存在损失厌恶,研究零售商的订货和定价策略,以及顾客损失厌恶程度对零售商决策行为的影响,同时探讨零售商通过补偿契约对损失厌恶型顾客的激励问题,得到如下主要结论:顾客损失厌恶导致零售商利润和零售价格下降,订货量和需求量增加;零售商采取补偿契约能够提高零售商利润、零售价格、订货量和需求量,有效弱化了顾客损失厌恶给企业带来的负面影响,并且,只要补偿额不超过一定限度,补偿契约也会增加顾客的效用,实现企业与顾客双赢.

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