Optimal Policies of an Innovating Firm Permitted to Take over Its Competitor
允许收购竞争者时创新企业的最优策略

One firm conducts cost\|reducing R&D in a duopoly. The innovating firm may take over its rival either before or after the R&D activities are conducted. The corresponding takeover policies are called ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover, respectively. The first part of the paper makes a comparison between ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover. It is shown that, the innovating firm chooses ex\|ante takeover for large spillover and ex\|post takeover for small spillover. It is remarkable that the takeover policy chosen by the innovating firm also maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus. The second part of the paper compares no takeover with ex\|post takeover and ex\|ante takeover, respectively. No takeover is never the innovating firm's optimal policy, but it maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus under some cases.