%0 Journal Article
%T Optimal Policies of an Innovating Firm Permitted to Take over Its Competitor<br>允许收购竞争者时创新企业的最优策略
%A HUO Pei
%A |jun
%A <br>霍沛军
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2002
%I 
%X One firm conducts cost\|reducing R&D in a duopoly. The innovating firm may take over its rival either before or after the R&D activities are conducted. The corresponding takeover policies are called ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover, respectively. The first part of the paper makes a comparison between ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover. It is shown that, the innovating firm chooses ex\|ante takeover for large spillover and ex\|post takeover for small spillover. It is remarkable that the takeover policy chosen by the innovating firm also maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus. The second part of the paper compares no takeover with ex\|post takeover and ex\|ante takeover, respectively. No takeover is never the innovating firm's optimal policy, but it maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus under some cases.
%K R&D
%K takeover
%K spillovers
%K game analyses<br>研究与发展
%K 收购
%K 溢出
%K 博弈分析
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=42F67BDACE0510A0&yid=C3ACC247184A22C1&vid=BC12EA701C895178&iid=DF92D298D3FF1E6E&sid=9CF7A0430CBB2DFD&eid=7801E6FC5AE9020C&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=0&reference_num=5