Quality Control Decision Analysis in BT Project under Asymmetic Information
信息非对称条件下BT 项目质量控制决策

In this paper,we study quality control policy and quality supervise level in BT project under different information back-grounds,we set up a game model between BT project owner and the contractor about quality control policy,discuss the quality supervise and money payment decision problem under symmetric information.In the models,quality supervise level and money payment variables for contract are decided by BT project owner,quality prevention level variables for contract are decided by BT contractor.Focus on the study of quality supervise and money payment decision problem under asymmetric information.Maximum principle is used to solve the optimum solution to quality supervise level and money payment variables by BT project owner when BT contractor control and self-evalution information is hard to observe completely.At last,count and analyse is done concerned with an highway BT project's quality control and those change of quality supervise cost,analyse results under different information setting are contrasted and analyzed.Results come from the example also show the validity of this quality control decision.