%0 Journal Article
%T Quality Control Decision Analysis in BT Project under Asymmetic Information<br>信息非对称条件下BT 项目质量控制决策
%A FU Hong-yuan
%A HE Shou-kui
%A <br>傅鸿源
%A 何寿奎
%J 系统工程理论与实践
%D 2006
%I 
%X In this paper,we study quality control policy and quality supervise level in BT project under different information back-grounds,we set up a game model between BT project owner and the contractor about quality control policy,discuss the quality supervise and money payment decision problem under symmetric information.In the models,quality supervise level and money payment variables for contract are decided by BT project owner,quality prevention level variables for contract are decided by BT contractor.Focus on the study of quality supervise and money payment decision problem under asymmetric information.Maximum principle is used to solve the optimum solution to quality supervise level and money payment variables by BT project owner when BT contractor control and self-evalution information is hard to observe completely.At last,count and analyse is done concerned with an highway BT project's quality control and those change of quality supervise cost,analyse results under different information setting are contrasted and analyzed.Results come from the example also show the validity of this quality control decision.
%K BT project
%K asymmetric information
%K maximum principle
%K quality control
%K quality supervise level<br>BT项目
%K 非对称信息
%K 极大值原理
%K 质量控制
%K 质量监督水平
%U http://www.alljournals.cn/get_abstract_url.aspx?pcid=01BA20E8BA813E1908F3698710BBFEFEE816345F465FEBA5&cid=962324E222C1AC1D&jid=1D057D9E7CAD6BEE9FA97306E08E48D3&aid=84EFC6E4FE2DCDA7&yid=37904DC365DD7266&vid=96C778EE049EE47D&iid=5D311CA918CA9A03&sid=CB423C9A71560A74&eid=80A07035DF96B0C4&journal_id=1000-6788&journal_name=系统工程理论与实践&referenced_num=3&reference_num=15