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Book Review: Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues, David Coen and Jeremy Richardson (eds.)
Alexandra Pop
Romanian Journal of European Affairs (RJEA) , 2013,
Abstract: The volume "Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues", collects 16 articles on interest group politics at EU level, focusing on the main elements of European lobbying - the existing relations between the EU institutions and the special interests, the main differences between NGO and business lobbying, the specific lobbying strategies adopted in EU's main policy sectors or lobbying regulations. The volume captures the main changes that took place on the European lobbying scene in the last two decades, period in which most EU institutions developed new points of access for lobbyists, while the interest groups became more specialized. The success of an EU lobbying campaign seems to be determined by a combination of various factors such as: a good knowledge of the EU environment, a wise usage of both financial resources and expertise, direct lobbying complemented by an efficient usage of domestic routes and the capability of creating smart alliances.
MODELOS DE REGULACIóN DEL LOBBY EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO
García,José Francisco;
Revista chilena de derecho , 2008, DOI: 10.4067/S0718-34372008000100005
Abstract: comparative law shows different approaches in the regulation of lobbying. on one side, we find the american model, based in detailed and extensive regulation; and, on the other, the u.k. experience, that have rejected a statutory regulation, and promotes the industry self regulation and other mechanisms pro-transparency. also, we find the scheme implemented by the european union (eu), that is very similar to the u.k. model. for the author, this debate seems relevant for the discussion in chile, that has followed an important part of the american legislation, and more over, it seems that the local debate has not considered the other models. in the conclusions, the article describes some lessons that must be taken into account and formulates some policy recommendations for addressing the discussion in chile
LOBBYING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LOBBYING REGULATION
Liliana Mihu？
Romanian Journal of European Affairs (RJEA) , 2008,
Abstract: The paper compares lobbying in the United States and in the European Union taking into account the specific environments in the two areas. It is focused on recent developments (2006 – 2008) in lobbying regulation in the US, at the federal level, and in the EU, at the level of the European institutions. The compulsory system typical of the American approach is compared to the lower regulated system specific to the European Parliament, as well as to the self-regulatory approach that is still proper to the European Commission, even though its recent decisions indicate a departure from it. The main conclusions highlight the increasing similarities between the American and European approaches, as well as the differences that still exist, mainly in the framework of the pluralist – corporatist dichotomy. Having in view this background, the concluding remarks also stress the need to intensify the debates on lobbying regulation in Romania.
Regulácia lobingu na Slovensku: analyza sú asnych trendov
Slavomíra Urbanová
St？edoevropské Politické Studie , 2012,
Abstract: The Regulation of Lobbying in Slovakia: An Analysis of Contemporary Trends One of the fundamental features of liberal democratic systems is the existence of diverse interests that seek to influence government decisions. It is therefore no surprise that the activities of organized interests present a natural and legitimate part of the democratic process. Nevertheless, we regard lobbyists with considerable skepticism, and the concept of lobbying often has negative connotations. This situation is mainly the result of a growth in the diversification and number of organized interests that often act in informal or unfair ways. Trying to distinguish lobbying from corruption or other illegal ways of influencing people in public office has led many countries to make efforts to level the playing field and the processes that take place in it. The result of these efforts is the introduction of the regulation of lobbying, which may be achieved by means of various tools. The aim of this paper is to briefly map the attempts by the Slovak government to establish rules governing the behavior of organized interests in the Slovak Republic and to identify the preferences of the particular actors in the Slovak political system with respect to the issue of regulating lobbying in Slovakia.
Political economy of the US financial crisis 2007-2009
Vuk Vukovi？
Financial Theory and Practice , 2011,
Abstract: The emphasis of this paper is on the political economy of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and how the policy makers contributed to it through their legislation and regulations, made under the rising influence of interest groups and the lobbying activities of the finance industry. The “Great Recession” of 2007-2009 began as a bubble-burst in the mortgage market in the United States that spilled over to the entire financial market of the US, and afterwards to the integrated world financial market. The crisis sprang up over the US real sector and, due to the decline in US aggregate demand, spread consequently to the real economy of the rest of the World. No sound evidence has been given for the publicly proclaimed idea that the causes of the crisis lie within the self-regulating free market. The causes of the crisis lie primarily in the activities of political power, i.e. in the extensive government regulation which has, under the strong influence of interest groups and the lobbying power of financial corporations, led to favouritism in macroeconomic policies and inefficient resource allocation. Regulation was enforced by stimulating affordable housing through government sponsored enterprises, oligopoly of the rating agencies, banking regulation and an increasing connection between government and the finance industry.
Invisible, Unfettered and Predictable—The Patterning of Corporate Political Activity in the UK  [PDF]
Mama Z. Kone, Tom Farnhill
Open Journal of Business and Management (OJBM) , 2019, DOI: 10.4236/ojbm.2019.74123
Abstract: Corporate interests’ access to the UK Cabinet Office shows that corporate political activity in the UK is common, involving lobbying by large numbers of businesses from a wide range of industrial sectors—albeit with considerable sectoral variation. Firm size appears to be the most deterministic variable—larger firms enjoy significantly more access to government than small and medium-sized firms. However, most lobbying is undertaken by domestic firms—multinational firms, despite their size, may concentrate their lobbying on supranational institutions. Associations representing smaller businesses are also underrepresented. The patterning and behaviour of corporate political activity in the UK—largely unregulated—mirrors that of jurisdictions where it is more regulated and monitored; inviting either a reappraisal of the impact of regulation on lobbying or a consideration of why UK lobbying, unfettered and relatively invisible, behaves in an identical manner.
MODELOS DE REGULACIóN DEL LOBBY EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO
José Francisco García
Revista Chilena de Derecho : Publicado por la Facultad de Derecho Universidad Católica de Chile , 2008,
Abstract: El derecho comparado muestra enfoques distintos a la hora de abordar el lobby. Destacan, por un lado, la experiencia americana, basada principalmente en una detallada y extensiva regulación de esta figura; y por el otro, la del Reino Unido, que ha optado por rechazar la regulación estatutaria, apoyándose en cambio en la autorregulación de la industria y otros mecanismos pro transparencia de la toma de decisiones públicas. Asimismo, se da cuenta del enfoque adoptado en la Unión Europea (UE), cercano al modelo del Reino Unido. Para el autor, este debate parece en extremo relevante en la medida en que Chile ha seguido parte importante de la regulación americana, y más aún, el debate local pareciera no haber considerado suficientemente los modelos alternativos. En las conclusiones, el documento plantea algunas lecciones que se deben considerar y definiciones de política para abordar la cuestión en Chile Comparative Law shows different approaches in the regulation of lobbying. On one side, we find the American model, based in detailed and extensive regulation; and, on the other, the U.K. experience, that have rejected a statutory regulation, and promotes the industry self regulation and other mechanisms pro-transparency. Also, we find the scheme implemented by the European Union (EU), that is very similar to the U.K. model. For the author, this debate seems relevant for the discussion in Chile, that has followed an important part of the American legislation, and more over, it seems that the local debate has not considered the other models. In the conclusions, the article describes some lessons that must be taken into account and formulates some policy recommendations for addressing the discussion in Chile
A Political Economy Model of Capital Expropriation and Skilled Migration  [PDF]
Kirk A. Collins
Theoretical Economics Letters (TEL) , 2013, DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.35045
Abstract: This paper studies the interplay of capital resources in a small open economy by way of a general equilibrium political economy model. Normative implications for human capital migration resulting from physical capital lobbying are analyzed. Findings reveal that lobbying designed to mitigate the capital levy problem leads to increased human capital migration and that optimal tax policy for a social welfare maximizing government necessarily implies “brain drain”. The implication being that skilled migration may be an inevitable by-product of a self-interested government. As such, while governments may vow to do something to stem the flow of their “best and brightest”, the financial pull of increased revenues appears simply too great to imply anything other than lip service, when general equilibrium effects are considered. As a corollary, we find that restrictions on political contributions are welfare enhancing in the two-sided expropriations model we present.
The clarity of the majority’s preference moderates the influence of lobbying on representation
Joan Barceló
- , 2019, DOI: 10.1177/1354068817715803
Abstract: Delegate conceptions of representation require activities of legislators to reflect their constituents’ preferences. Recent research has examined the distortionary effects of lobbying activities on this representational linkage. Here, I argue that the effect of interest groups on legislators’ behavior depends on the clarity of the majority’s preferences in a district. When the electorate is narrowly divided, Members of Parliament (MPs) may choose to reap the benefits associated with interest groups as costs from defection are lowest. The results show that MP defection from constituents’ preferences is only positively associated with sectional interest group ties when the constituency is narrowly divided on an issue. Likewise, MP defection is only negatively associated with an MP’s ties to cause groups when the constituency is narrowly divided on an issue. These results are important because they specify the conditions under which interest group lobbying is sufficient to override constituents’ preferences
Advocacy and Policy Change in the Multilevel System of the European Union: A Case Study within Health Policy  [PDF]
Nadia Carboni
Open Journal of Political Science (OJPS) , 2012, DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2012.23005
Abstract: Health policy is basically Member States’ competence. However, the European Union has recently raised a number of key questions facing both (pharmaceutical) industries and public health interests. By applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the paper sheds light on policy change within the European multilevel system. The analysis is based on a case-study strategy. Two processes in the pharmaceutical policy are taken into account: the “Pharma Forum” and the “Pharma Package”. They both concern “information to patient”—a controversial policy issue at the crossroad of competing pressures.
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