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条块关系视角下长三角科创一体化的府际合作困境
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Abstract:
长三角科创一体化是实现科技自立自强与高质量发展的关键路径,但在迈向涉及核心利益的“深水区”过程中,仍面临行政壁垒固化与协作动力不足的严峻挑战。本文立足于中国政府治理的“条块结构”视角,结合协同优势与制度性集体行动理论,构建了“条块结构–府际互动–行动策略”的分析框架,深入解构市级政府陷入“协同惰性”的制度逻辑。研究发现,纵向维度的威权碎片化与“行政发包”体制诱发了地方政府的资源依附与策略性执行;横向维度的“晋升锦标赛”压力与不完全契约属性则导致了相对收益焦虑与信任赤字,致使府际合作陷入“囚徒困境”。基于此,本文提出走出困境的治理路径:纵向推动科创标准的向上统筹与向下互认,横向建立基于统计分劈与税收分成的利益相容机制并重塑考核导向,同时辅以要素配置市场化与治理数字化、法治化手段,以重塑区域合作动力机制,推动长三角科创一体化向纵深发展。
The integration of scientific and technological (sci-tech) innovation in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) serves as a critical path for achieving high-quality development and self-reliance in science and technology. However, as this integration advances into the “deep-water zone” involving core interests, it continues to face severe challenges characterized by solidified administrative barriers and insufficient collaborative motivation. Anchored in the “Tiao-Kuai structure” (vertical and horizontal structure) of Chinese governance, this paper combines the theories of collaborative advantage and Institutional Collective Action (ICA) to construct an analytical framework comprising “Tiao-Kuai structure - intergovernmental interaction - action strategies”. This framework is utilized to deeply deconstruct the institutional logic through which municipal governments fall into “collaborative inertia”. The findings indicate that in the vertical dimension, fragmented authority and the “administrative subcontracting” system induce resource dependence and strategic implementation among local governments. In the horizontal dimension, the pressure of “promotion tournaments” and the attributes of incomplete contracts lead to anxiety over relative gains and a trust deficit, thereby trapping intergovernmental cooperation in a “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Consequently, this paper proposes governance paths to resolve these dilemmas: vertically promoting the upward coordination and downward mutual recognition of sci-tech standards; and horizontally establishing incentive-compatible mechanisms based on statistical division and tax sharing, while reshaping performance evaluation orientations. Furthermore, the paper suggests supplementing these measures with market-oriented factor allocation, digital governance, and rule-of-law approaches to reshape the dynamics of regional cooperation and drive the in-depth development of sci-tech
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