The United States remains a dominant exporter of integrated circuits (ICs), a cornerstone of global technological advancement and industrial competitiveness. However, the evolving geopolitical and policy landscape has reshaped export flows, partner concentration, and the structure of value creation within the global semiconductor ecosystem. This study examines the dynamics of U.S. IC exports from 2015 to 2024, evaluating shifts in competitiveness and market diversification using a framework built on Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Using annual UN Comtrade data for HS codes 8542 (ICs), the analysis identifies a post-2022 realignment driven by trade tensions and industrial policy interventions such as the CHIPS and Science Act. Results reveal a decline in exports to East Asia—especially the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong SAR—accompanied by increased flows to Mexico, Singapore, and the European Union. These findings suggest a regionalized restructuring of U.S. semiconductor exports toward allied economies. From a business management perspective, this shift reflects a growing emphasis on resilience, policy alignment, and strategic adaptation within global supply networks.
References
[1]
Balassa, B. (1965). Trade Liberalisation and “Revealed” Comparative Advantage. TheManchesterSchool,33, 99-123. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.1965.tb00050.x
[2]
Belbali, A., Gasmi, M. A., Ouldbahammou, S., Yousfat, A., & Azizi, A. O. (2024). Measuring and Analyzing Economic Diversification Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. European Economic Letters, 14, 3026-3028. https://eelet.org.uk/index.php/journal/article/view/2078/1864
[3]
Bliemel, M., & Wixted, B. (2022). Measuring and Visualising Global Value Chains and Their Sensitivity to Disruption. University of Technology Sydney (UTS), TD School. https://www.schoolofpublicpolicy.sk.ca/csip/documents/research-paper-summaries/2022.03_global-value-chains-wixted-bliemel.pdf
[4]
Feenstra, R. C., & Taylor, A. M. (2017). International Economics (4th ed.). Worth Publishers.
[5]
Funke, M., & Wende, A. (2022). Modeling Semiconductor Export Restrictions and the US-China Trade Conflict. BOFIT Discussion Papers. Bank of Finland, Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT). https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/266395/1/1823657877.pdf
[6]
Hamdani, M., & Belfencha, I. (2024). Strategic Implications of the US-China Semiconductor Rivalry. DiscoverGlobalSociety,2, Article No. 67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-024-00081-5
[7]
Hummels, D., Ishii, J., & Yi, K. M. (2001). The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade. JournalofInternationalEconomics,54, 75-96. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(00)00093-3
[8]
Khan, S. M., Peterson, D., & Mann, A. (2021). The Semiconductor Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-Semiconductor-Supply-Chain-Issue-Brief-1.pdf
[9]
Lin, J., & Bethmann, E. (2023). Approaches of Measuring Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): Literature Review. U.S. International Trade Commission. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ec_working_paper_rca_in_gvc_analysis_july_2023_jones_bethmann.pdf
[10]
Nandi, A. (2025). India’s Semiconductor Ambitions and Global Competitiveness: Confronting the China Challenge. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-s-semiconductor-ambitions-and-global-competitiveness-confronting-the-china-challenge
[11]
Nathan Associates Inc (NAI) (2016). Beyond Borders: The Global Semiconductor Value Chain—How an Interconnected Industry Promotes Innovation and Growth. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/SIA-Beyond-Borders-Report-FINAL-June-7.pdf
[12]
Organisation for Economic Co Operation and Development (OECD) (2025). Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain: Working towards Identifying Dependencies and Vulnerabilities. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers No. 182. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/06/mapping-the-semiconductor-value-chain_5ba52971/4154cdbf-en.pdf
[13]
Reuters (2024). China Criticises US Tightening of Chip Export Rules. https://www.reuters.com/technology/china-criticises-us-tightening-chip-export-rules-2024-04-01/
[14]
U.S. Congress (2022). CHIPS and Science Act of 2022(Public Law 117-167, H.R. 4346). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346
[15]
Varadarajan, R., Koch-Weser, I., Richard, C., Fitzgerald, J., Singh, J., Thornton, M., Casanova, R., & Isaacs, D. (2024). Emerging Resilience in the Semiconductor Supply Chain. Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Report_Emerging-Resilience-in-the-Semiconductor-Supply-Chain.pdf
[16]
VerWey, J. (2019). The Health and Competitiveness of the U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Industry(Office of Industries Working Paper ID-058). U.S. International Trade Commission. https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/id_058_the_health_and_competitiveness_of_the_sme_industry_final_070219checked.pdf
[17]
Wiseman, B., Marcil, H., Alam, S., Liao, N., Roundtree, T., & Stopford, T. (2025). The Effects of Tariffs on the Semiconductor Industry. McKinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/semiconductors/our-insights/the-effects-of-tariffs-on-the-semiconductor-industry
[18]
Yellen, J. (2022). Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen at LG Sciencepark. U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0880
