This paper examines the foreign relations and international impact of the Taliban during their first period of rule from 1996 to 2001, focusing on interactions with global and regional powers amid the backdrop of the Afghan Civil War. The Taliban’s rise to power reshaped Afghanistan’s political landscape and posed challenges to the international order through its strict Islamic governance and strategic alliances. Despite limited international recognition, the Taliban engaged in diplomatic and military relations with key actors, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia, and neighboring Islamic states. These interactions were shaped by a complex mix of ideological alignment, security concerns, and economic interests. By analyzing the Taliban’s foreign policy during this period, the study provides insights into their approach to governance and international relations, offering a framework to understand the potential foreign policy strategies of the newly re-established Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The study highlights the Taliban’s influence on regional stability and the global response to Islamic extremism, drawing lessons from history to assess the future implications for the international order.
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