Lo que Descartes le podría haber dicho a Jaegwon Kim: Causalidad y dualismo sustancial

in the present paper i consider an argument of jaegwon kim's, presented in the third chapter of his physicalism or something near enough, which purports to show the inadequacy of substance dualism as a solution to the problem about the nature of mind. i intend to show that cartesian dualism is beyond the reach of kim's attack, provided that all the implications of descartes use of the theory of natural institution and of the notion of a psychophysical union are taken into account. moreover, kim's arguments directed towards the question of mind's nonspatiality, and its derived impossibility to enter into causal relations, seem to vanish, once we take into account, on the one hand, the fact that the cartesian man involves a union of mind and body which is such that they may be regarded as co-extensive and, on the other hand, the particular way, very near to occassionalism, in which descartes explains interaction.