DESCARTES'S MODAL RELIABILISM

this paper's objective is to undermine the standard reading on descartes's meditations, a reading which, abstracting from the skeptical challenge of a reduction of reason to absurdity which descartes is responding to, overstresses the epistemological priority of the cogito argument, and which, ignoring the anti-skeptical strategy deployed by descartes, is blind to the fact that, instead of trying to garner better support for nuclear propositions, he attempts to subtract grounds for doubt, working himself into an enlightened position from which those radical scenarios no longer make sense. descartes's proposal is a modal or metaphysical version of reliabilism analogous to the contemporary one defended by ernest sosa, a position capable of overcoming skepticism without a vicious circle and which demonstrates that a correct use of reason yields a theory on how things are in the world which precludes the unreliability of our cognitive faculties.