Sobre la inconsistencia teórica del positivismo incluyente1

professor juan carlos bayón has argued that inclusive legal positivism should be rejected because its plausibility depends on the idea of a social convention to follow nonconventional criteria of validity. in his view, if there were agreement on the content of these criteria, it would be impossible to sustain its non-conventional character; and without agreement, there would not be a common social practice, and thus no social rule would exist. therefore, inclusive positivism faces a dilemma: being indistinguishable from exclusive positivism or not being a genuine form of conventionalism at all. this article evaluates a possible way out of this dilemma. it explores the different versions of inclusive legal positivism and its limits, and tries to build an opposing argument grounded on the scope of the conventionality thesis that would rescue inclusive legal positivism from the accusation of theoretical inconsistency.