Cuerpo y finitud: Una cuestión decisiva en las filosofías de Merleau-Ponty y Nietzsche

the subject proposed by the modernity is not an incarnated one as long as it does without what obliges to admit the other: the body. because of that, in the play of objectivity, the body is an object too, the relationship with him and from him is interfered by the reflection and the sensitive experience ignoring the "lived body". nowadays in western countries to think about the subject is to think of the body. until the end of 20th century the body was ignored and this in a double sense: as a constitutive component of subjectivity and as a place of knowledge. this paper discusses the philosophy of merleau-ponty, which is essentially a meditation on the body and corporality as regards its relation to the nietzschean notion of the body from the assumption that the manner of considering the body and the bodily condition of man imply a decision about what is proper to the human condition.