Teoría crítica, justicia y metafilosofía: La validación de la filosofía política en Nancy Fraser y Axel Honneth*

when talking about justice and injustice, can philosophers, simply, take the victims' side? even when these philosophers belong to the critical theoretical perspective, can they be excused from providing an objective account of what is morally wrong? if, for instance, they hold that victims are demanding recognition, instead of redistribution, don't they need a social theory about how recognition plays its role in the shaping of justice and injustice? this article addresses these questions in regard to iris marion young, nancy fraser and axel honneth. although they subscribe to the critical theory's tradition, as well as involve recognition when talking about justice, their paths go in different directions when they have to explain how recognition is involved in social conflicts and political demands. the main purpose is to show that their differences have to do, mainly, with two different understandings of political philosophy as an intellectual enterprise.