Complementariedades dinámicas, eficiencia y equilibrio de Nash en un modelo de firmas y trabajadores

in this paper we show the evolution of an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (high-skilled and low-skilled). workers' decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and depend on the initial distribution of the firms. there exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level state which is asymptotically stable. there exists a threshold number of the initial firms, which once overcame leads to the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibria. we show that at each high level equilibrium, there exists a mix of innovative and non-innovative firms, as well as a combination of high-skilled and non-skilled workers. instead, if the initial percentage of innovative firms is lower than the threshold value, then the economy evolves towards a low level equilibrium wholly composed of non-innovative firms and low-skilled workers.