De la crítica de Davidson a la idea de relativismo conceptual

in this paper we explore davidson？s arguments against conceptual relativism. his criticism consists of three parts: the claim that the notion of uninterpreted content (to which correspond several schemes) lacks intelligibility; the assumption that the idea of the multiplicity of conceptual schemes is the same as the idea of the multiplicity of beliefs on a common world; the argument that the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences is closely connected to the scheme-content distinction, for rejecting the former arguably involves rejecting the latter. however, the arguments davidson gives against conceptual schemes have not success in reaching the conceptual relativism. we argue that davidson？s account of conceptual schemes is inadequate, and that he fails to provide a serious objection to the possibility of radically different schemes. in consequence, we also argue that, whatever the judgment supported against relativism, davidson？s criticism does not suffice to show the incoherence of the idea of conceptual relativism.