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Risk Generation Mechanisms and Regulatory Governance of U.S. Treasury-Pegged Stablecoins: A Perspective on the Interplay of U.S. Treasury Derivative Mechanisms

DOI: 10.4236/me.2026.176039, PP. 736-761

Keywords: USD-Pegged Stablecoins, Monetary Creation, Money Laundering Risks, Look-Through Regulation

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Abstract:

Treasury-pegged stablecoins allocate a significant portion of their reserve assets to short-term U.S. Treasury bonds, deeply linking the stablecoin’s credit foundation to the Treasury bond derivation mechanism. Analysis grounded in monetary creation theory and shadow banking theory reveals that Treasury-pegged stablecoins are exposed to Treasury interest rate risk and credit risk on the asset side, while on the liability side, they create vulnerabilities to digital bank runs through maturity mismatches and instant redemption commitments. Risks propagate sequentially along the “asset side → liability side → market side” chain and are amplified bidirectionally between the stablecoin and Treasury markets via reserve effects and run effects. The three-tiered interlinked pathway of “reserve anchoring - cross-border circulation - derivative expansion” constitutes the structural foundation for cross-border risk transmission and gives rise to four types of money laundering risks: information arbitrage, dual concealment, derivative acceleration, and regulatory arbitrage. Global regulation exhibits a divergence into three paradigms: “dollar-centric”, “risk-tiered”, and “licensed access”. Regulatory fragmentation and asymmetries in technological capabilities constitute the core governance dilemma. A systemic governance framework centered on the “functional-penetrative” approach—integrating a classified regulatory system, technological synergy between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and coordination with international standards—represents a viable path to prevent cross-border risk transmission and safeguard monetary sovereignty.

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