This paper analyzes the intervention mechanisms and strategic consequences of U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) companies in U.S. government foreign, military, and diplomatic decision-making during the Trump administration’s second term. It argues that AI firms and related chip and software companies—represented by Palantir, Anthropic, OpenAI, Nvidia, and xAI—have penetrated the formulation and implementation of national foreign policy through technology embedding, personnel circulation, and data sharing, forming a tight decision-making alliance with the White House and the Department of War. This paper terms this configuration the “New Silicon Triangle” to distinguish it from the established use of the same phrase to describe the semiconductor relationship among the United States, Chinese Mainland, and the Taiwan region. While the New Silicon Triangle ostensibly enhances executive agility and accelerates resource allocation in great-power technological competition, it systematically erodes democratic accountability, fragments foreign-policy coherence, depletes soft-power resources, and subordinates strategic deliberation to commercial and computational logics. By identifying four embedding mechanisms—formal institutional restructuring, algorithmic monopoly over military power, algorithm-driven populist mobilization, and the reshaping of decision-making architecture—and five strategic consequences—cognitive closure, alliance centrifugality, policy fragmentation, soft-power depletion, and domestic democratic erosion—the paper extends the classical iron-triangle tradition, brings the algorithmic-politics literature into dialogue with Foreign Policy Analysis, and offers the first systematic mapping of Trump-era institutional innovations (DOGE, the reconstituted PCAST under tech-capital leadership, Detachment 201) as a coherent restructuring of U.S. foreign-policy decision-making. The paper concludes that the New Silicon Triangle is not a solution to the American strategic predicament but a profound manifestation of it.
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