This study examines the sociological mechanisms through which fiscal legitimacy and institutional trust influence corporate tax compliance behaviour in Romania. Drawing on quantitative survey data from 162 companies and semi-structured interviews with corporate decision-makers, the research reveals a fundamental paradox: while tax compliance rates are relatively high among large and medium-sized firms, this compliance is predominantly externally imposed through coercive mechanisms such as surveillance, sanctions, and pressures from banks and business partners, rather than being rooted in internalised fiscal norms or institutional legitimacy. The findings indicate that 37.1% of respondents perceive tax law enforcement as inconsistent, 58% lack confidence in the use of tax revenues, and 56.8% view the tax system as unfair. This erosion of procedural and distributive legitimacy undermines the fiscal social contract and transforms compliance into a defensive strategy that is vulnerable in the long term. The study contributes to fiscal sociology by demonstrating that, in the absence of legitimacy, intensified control produces formal but unsustainable compliance. It advocates for the reconstruction of institutional trust as the foundation of a viable tax system.
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