重思波默物之绽出及其向海德格尔此在存在论的批判
Reconsidering the Ekstase of B？hmean Beings and Its Critical Engagement with Heidegger’s Ontology of Dasein

气氛美学中，格诺特·波默指出了一种物的气氛性绽出，在基础存在论时期的海德格尔那里，提法却是此在之时间性绽出，且著书过程中，波默不时直指海德格尔在思考物的本质、人与物关系上的局限。本文主要对勘二人之“物”与“绽出”，并通过“物”的主题进一步指出，波默之批判固然补足了物的研究视角，却在界定海德格尔之此在存在论方面产生了一定的误读，因此需要在后者的本意中加以看待。无论如何，二者对于物的考量均是切入人和物之本真关系的可贵路径。
In the aesthetics of atmospheres, Gernot B？hme articulates an atmospheric ek-stasis of things, whereas Heidegger, during his early fundamental ontology, emphasizes the temporal ek-stasis of Dasein. Notably, B？hme’s writings intermittently engage in a critical interrogation of Heidegger’s limitations in conceptualizing the essence of things and human-thing relations. This paper conducts a comparative analysis of their respective conceptions of “things” and “Ekstase,” further arguing that while B？hme’s critique enriches the phenomenological perspective on things, it risks misinterpreting Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein by overlooking its existential-hermeneutic intentionality. Consequently, B？hme’s critique demands reevaluation through Heidegger’s original framework. Ultimately, both thinkers offer invaluable pathways to rethinking the authentic relationship between humans and things.