胡塞尔与马克思关于主体性问题的三重维度对比研究
A Tri-Dimensional Comparative Analysis of Subjectivity in Karl Marx and Edmund Husserl

近代哲学自笛卡尔以“我思”确立主体性基点后，经历了唯理论、经验论到德国观念论的演进，黑格尔以“绝对精神”消解客体性，导致哲学陷入抽象思维与生活世界的割裂。胡塞尔与马克思分别通过不同路径回应这一困境：胡塞尔基于现象学构建“具身性–主体间性–生活世界”体系，试图在意识结构中重建主客体关系；马克思则以“现实的个人”为出发点，通过实践联结主体与对象世界，将主体性嵌入历史性维度。二者虽在方法论上存在先验现象学与唯物论的根本分歧，但均致力于弥合主体与世界的分裂。本文试图通过对两者的比较研究分析胡塞尔与马克思在主体问题上的不同与相似之处。
Since Descartes established the foundational subjectivity through “cogito” in modern philosophy, the intellectual trajectory has evolved through Rationalism, Empiricism, and German Idealism. Hegel’s dissolution of objectivity through the “Absolute Spirit” precipitated a philosophical schism between abstract speculation and the lifeworld. Husserl and Marx respectively addressed this predicament through divergent approaches: Husserl constructed a tripartite system of “embodied subjectivity-intersubjectivity-lifeworld” through phenomenological methodology, seeking to reconstruct subject-object relations within conscious structures; Marx grounded his philosophy in “real individuals” as the starting point, synthesizing subjectivity with the objective world through praxis while embedding agency within historical becoming. Though fundamentally divided by their transcendental-phenomenological methodologies and materialism, both philosophers converged in their endeavor to reconcile the subject-world dichotomy. This comparative study undertakes a critical examination of their paradigmatic approaches to subjectivity, analyzing both ontological convergences and epistemological divergences in their respective resolutions to the modern philosophical crisis.