政府补贴下县域医共体三方主体演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Three-Party Subject of County-Level Medical Community under Government Subsidies

目的：县域医共体是我国解决医疗供给侧与需求侧结构性失衡的重要举措，对提升医疗供给质量、推动医疗数字化转型具有重要意义。方法：本文基于演化博弈理论，构建了县域医共体牵头单位、成员单位与患者之间的博弈模型，刻画有限理性主体的决策行为，通过求解纳什均衡分析各主体策略选择的演化路径，并借助Matlab2021b仿真分析验证理论模型。研究结果表明，政府补贴力度、不同补贴对象等因素对各方主体策略选择具有显著影响，提出了相应的实践策略建议，以期为县域医共体的协同发展提供理论支持和决策参考。
Objective: County-level medical community of common interest (hereinafter referred to as “medical consortium”) is an important measure in China to address the structural imbalance between the medical supply side and the demand side. It is of great significance for improving the quality of medical supply and promoting the digital transformation of the medical industry. Methods: Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a game model among the leading units, member units, and patients of the county-level medical consortium, depicting the decision-making behaviors of boundedly rational agents. By solving the Nash equilibrium, the evolutionary paths of strategy choices of each subject are analyzed. The theoretical model is verified through Matlab 2021b simulation analysis. Results: The study shows that the intensity of government subsidies and different subsidy targets have a significant impact on the strategy choices of all parties. Corresponding practical strategy suggestions are put forward to provide theoretical support and decision-making references for the coordinated development of county-level medical consortiums.