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情绪性刺激的消失与出现对施动感的影响
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Abstract:
施动感是指个体对行为和行为结果的控制感。以往的研究多集中在使刺激出现的动作情境，而对使刺激消失的动作情境中的施动感研究较少。时间捆绑效应作为反映施动感的主要量化指标，指的是主观上主动动作和动作结果的时间点相互靠近的现象。本研究通过一个被试内设计实验，运用时距估计法考察了情绪性刺激的消失与出现对施动感的影响。结果发现，个体主动使刺激消失或出现均存在时间捆绑效应，在消失情境中，主动按键使消极刺激消失相对于主动使积极刺激消失的过程，时间捆绑效应更强。结果表明，个体主动使刺激消失过程中同样能体验到施动感，同时，主动使消极刺激消失相对于主动使积极刺激消失，施动感更强。
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over actions and action outcomes. Previous studies were mostly confined to the situation of performing actions to make objects appear, while it remains unexplored whether we experience sense of agency when making objects disappear. Intentional binding, as the main quantitative index reflecting the sense of agency, refers to the phenomenon that the time point of the subjective active action and the action result are close to each other. In this study, a within-subjects design experiment was conducted to investigate the effect of the disappearance and appearance of emotional stimuli on sense of agency by using time interval estimation. Results show that intentional binding exists when individuals make the stimulus disappear or appear. In the disappearance situation, intentional binding is stronger in the process of making the negative stimulus disappear than that of making the positive stimulus disappear. Results show that individuals can also experience the sense of agency when they make the stimulus disappear. Meanwhile, sense of agency is stronger when making the negative stimulus disappear than when making the active stimulus disappear.
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