朴素实在论的关系进路及其问题
The Relational Approach to Na？ve Realism and Its Problems

当代对知觉问题的研究大都可以追溯到对知觉经验的透明性与扭曲性的关注。朴素实在论作为直接实在论的代表，主张知觉的对象或事件总如其所是地呈现，因其与常识的相符而越来越受到欢迎。但是，朴素实在论存在着命题概念不够清晰的问题：构成主张与关系主张的关系问题。当代研究普遍认为构成主张应该作为关系主张的必然结果存在，以坎贝尔为代表的朴素实在论者将关系论与朴素实在论看作是是同一论题的替代名称。学者索特里奥提出了不同的观点，认为朴素实在论并非必需承诺关系主张，并提出了显像论证的方案，本文基于对此方案的分析，探讨朴素实在论是否必须承诺关系论，以期获得一些从哲学角度研究知觉所需的启示。
Much of contemporary research on the problem of perception can be traced back to concerns about the transparency and perceptual distortion. Na？ve Realism, as a representative of Direct Realism, claims that the object or event of perception always presents itself as it is, and has become increasingly popular because of its consistency with common sense. However, Na？ve Realism suffers from a lack of clarity in the concept of proposition: the problem of the relationship between constitutive and relational claim. Contemporary research generally assumes that constitutive claim should be understood as a corollary of relational claim. Na？ve Realism, represented by Campbell, see relationalism and Na？ve Realism as alternative names for the same thesis. Soteriou offers a different view, arguing that na？ve realism is not required to commit to relational claims, and proposes the argument from appearing, based on an analysis of which this paper explores whether plain positivism is required to commit to relationalism, with a view to obtaining some of the insights needed to study perception from a philosophical point of view.