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基于扎根理论的大股东掏空行为多案例研究
Multi-Case Study on Major Shareholder Tunneling Behavior Based on Grounded Theory

DOI: 10.12677/mm.2025.153068, PP. 68-77

Keywords: 大股东掏空,公司治理,扎根理论
Major Shareholder Tunneling
, Corporate Governance, Grounded Theory

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Abstract:

随着我国资本市场的迅猛扩张,监管体系和法律框架难以迅速适应市场变化,导致诸多乱象频发,尤其是一些上市公司的大股东掏空行为,他们利用绝对控制权和信息不对称,侵占公司资产,严重损害中小股东利益,影响市场稳定。鉴于当前处于“十四五”规划的关键之年,金融市场整治刻不容缓,本文基于扎根理论,深入分析了ST东洋、欧浦退和ST中珠三家公司的大股东掏空行为,揭示了股权失衡、信息不对称、公司治理缺陷、第三方监管宽松和公司经营压力等五大问题,并提出了优化股权结构、完善内控制度、信息披露机制、部门独立性和第三方监督等对策,以助力金融市场健康发展。
With the rapid expansion of China’s capital market, the regulatory system and legal framework have struggled to keep pace with market changes, leading to frequent irregularities. In particular, the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in some listed companies, who exploit their absolute control and information asymmetry to misappropriate company assets, severely harms the interests of minority shareholders and undermines market stability. Given that the current period is a critical year for the “14th Five-Year Plan,” the rectification of financial markets is urgent. Based on grounded theory, this paper conducts an in-depth analysis of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders in three companies—ST Dongyang, Oupu Retirement, and ST Zhongzhu—revealing five major issues: equity imbalance, information asymmetry, corporate governance deficiencies, lax third-party supervision, and operational pressures. The paper proposes countermeasures such as optimizing equity structure, improving internal control systems, enhancing information disclosure mechanisms, strengthening departmental independence, and reinforcing third-party supervision to promote the healthy development of financial markets.

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