This study explores whether nuclear-armed states contribute to a more peaceful world. First, it introduces the background of nuclear proliferation, including its origins, the countries involved, and its impact on global security. The paper then examines the definition of “peace”, distinguishing between positive peace (the absence of structural violence) and negative peace (a temporary cessation of conflict). Through case studies—including the Korean War, Eisenhower’s nuclear policy, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Russia-Ukraine war, the paper argues that nuclear proliferation primarily results in negative peace rather than lasting stability and positive peace. The study further explores two opposing perspectives on nuclear proliferation. Kenneth Waltz advocates for nuclear deterrence, asserting that nuclear weapons stabilize international relations by discouraging conflicts through the fear of retaliation. In contrast, Scott Sagan and other scholars argue that nuclear proliferation increases the risk of war, especially when irrational leaders, military organizations, or non-state actors (e.g., terrorists) gain access to nuclear weapons. Also, the study examines the U.S. role in nuclear disarmament, highlighting past efforts such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and other arms control agreements. However, the complexity of nuclear proliferation persists, with new nuclear states emerging and threatening global security. The paper concludes that nuclear weapons do not foster true world peace; instead, they heighten fear, instability, and the potential for catastrophic conflicts. To achieve lasting peace, nuclear disarmament is essential to mitigate risks and promote positive global stability.
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