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电商直播“全网最低价”条款的反垄断法规制
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Abstract:
近年来电商直播领域存在的“全网最低价”条款属于典型的代理模式下的平台最惠国条款。其存在市场封锁、共谋、损害消费者福利等限制竞争效果,需要通过反垄断法予以规制,但也具有降低交易成本等促进竞争效果,不宜一概禁止。垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位制度都是规制电商直播平台最惠国条款(PMFN条款)的必需手段。通过这两种制度规制电商直播平台最惠国条款(PMFN条款)时分别面临代理人独立性判断、市场支配地位认定的困境。在垄断协议规制方面,可以结合电商直播行业特点,以市场影响力、责任承担作为独立性的认定标准。在滥用市场支配地位规制方面,可以引入共同市场支配地位、丰富认定市场支配地位的考虑因素帮助认定市场支配地位。
In recent years, the “lowest price on the net” clause in the field of e-commerce live streaming belongs to the typical platform most-favored-nation clause (PMFN clause) under the agency model. It has the effect of restricting competition such as market blockade, conspiracy, and harming consumer welfare, which needs to be regulated through the antitrust law, but also has the effect of promoting competition such as reducing transaction costs, which is not suitable to be prohibited altogether. Monopoly agreements and abuse of the dominant market position are both necessary means to regulate the PMFN clause. Regulating the PMFN clause through these two regimes, it faces the dilemmas of judging the independence of agents and determining the dominant market position respectively. The regulation of monopoly agreements, can be combined with the characteristics of the e-commerce live broadcast industry, market influence, liability as the determination of independence standards. As for the regulation of abuse of dominant market position, common dominant market position can be introduced, and the considerations for determining dominant market position can be enriched to help determine dominant market position.
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