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基于指标的治理:历史脉络、实施路径和效果评价
Governance by Indicators: Historical Context, Implementation Pathways and Effect Evaluation

DOI: 10.12677/sd.2025.152040, PP. 50-58

Keywords: 指标治理,标准化,数字治理,悬浮,异化
Governance by Indicators
, Standardization, Digital Governance, Suspension, Alienation

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Abstract:

随着数字社会的深入发展以及社会活动的日益量化,指标在某些治理领域产生了显著成效,从而受到学界关注。从中央政府到各级地方政府、从战略性的规划纲要到特定领域的监管政策,用指标来指引政府治理行为和考核治理成效已经成为越来越普遍的现象。指标治理是将任务目标转化为具体的、可量化的指标,通过层层分解、运行、考核、监督,以实现对国家治理任务的精细化管理和标准化控制,为公共管理构建了清晰与规范的治理新模式。从“数字治理”到“指标治理”的发展进路,强化了激励与约束这两种并行的核心治理逻辑,但也导致了指标异化和指标悬浮等现象。未来,指标治理的研究可重点关注指标治理的理论建构、指标治理各环节的有机衔接以及中国情境的指标治理实践,尤其是对微观层面的指标与主体之间的互动及其复杂逻辑的关注。
With the in-depth development of the digital society and the increasing quantification of social activities, indicators have achieved remarkable results in some governance fields, thus attracting the attention of the academic community. From the central government to local governments at all levels, and from strategic planning outlines to regulatory policies in specific fields, using indicators to guide government governance behaviors and assess governance effectiveness has become an increasingly common phenomenon. Governance by indicators is to transform task objectives into specific and quantifiable indicators. Through decomposition at different levels, operation, assessment, and supervision, it achieves refined management and standardized control of national governance tasks, thus constructing a clear and standardized new governance model for public management. The development path from “digital governance” to “governance by indicators” has strengthened the two parallel core governance mechanisms of incentive and restraint, but it has also led to phenomena such as indicator alienation and indicator suspension. In the future, research on governance by indicators can focus on the theoretical construction of indicator-based governance, the organic connection of various links in indicator-based governance, and the practice of indicator-based governance in the Chinese context, especially paying attention to the interaction between indicators at the micro-level and the subjects and their complex logic.

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