Apart from the knowledge of specialists in the field of Islamic law, the perception of Islamic law, for the most part, is that of a law with no structure and, therefore, no logical consistency. This depiction is often theorized by using the term Kadijustiz. In this essay, I seek to undermine this view and propose that Islamic legal theorists developed a systematic process of employing formal logic in Islamic law. I argue that these arguments exist, were negotiated regarding the nuances of their form and modes of applicability, and were utilized in concrete cases in books of Islamic legal theory. By formal logic, I am referring to inferential forms of reasoning. The paper is divided into two main parts: first, I describe the notion of Kadijustiz and offer objections to this view. Second, I explain the primary arguments that fall under the category of qiyas. These include, broadly, deduction, induction, and legal analogy. My hope is that this essay contributes to the appreciation of Islamic Law as a rigorous legal system and serves as a reference for some of the modes of thinking and processes of legal reasoning when engaging with Islamic law.
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