考虑溢价补贴的发电商参与碳–电市场决策的研究
Research on the Decision-Making of Electricity Producers Participating in the Carbon-Electricity Market Considering Premium Subsidy

在达成“双碳”目标和普及可再生能源使用的影响下，我国电力市场与碳交易市场分别面临着结构转型与增长不足的重大挑战，可再生能源发电比例增长与其消纳之间的不平衡导致碳交易市场和电力市场需要对市场机制进行优化。在这个过程中，政府为了减少发电碳排放并提高发电效率，会对发电商提供补贴，在新的补贴模式下不同类型发电商的决策难度增加。为了确定对发电商提供的补贴的有效性，并为发电商的决策提供帮助，文章提出了一种使用溢价来计算社会福利损失的方式，对不同类型发电商参与电力市场和碳交易市场的决策进行了分析。首先，文章根据发电商参与碳–电市场供给的不同阶段，构建了溢价补贴模型，并划分三个场景用于验证溢价补贴模型的有效性以及观察发电商在不同社会用电场景下的决策；然后，根据发电商参与碳–电市场交易的流程，构建基于溢价补贴的决策模型，以优化决策模型的方式体现溢价补贴模型对电力系统和发电商决策的影响。算例结果对发电量、碳排放、溢价补贴总量和发电商收益从总体和个体的角度进行了分析，说明了使用溢价补贴模型的有效性，同时发现了碳排放系数低的发电商在进行发电决策时具有优势，政府补贴不对发电类型进行区分会造成更多的无效补贴等。
Under the influence of achieving the “dual carbon” goals and the popularization of renewable energy usage, China’s electricity market and carbon trading market respectively confront significant challenges, such as structural transformation and insufficient growth. The imbalance between the increase in the proportion of renewable energy generation and its consumption has led to the need for optimization of the market mechanisms in both the carbon trading market and the electricity market. In this process, in order to reduce carbon emissions from power generation and enhance generation efficiency, the government will provide subsidies to power generators. In the new subsidy mode, the decision-making difficulty for different types of power generators has increased. To determine the effectiveness of the subsidies provided to power generators and offer assistance for their decision-making, this article proposes a method of calculating social welfare losses using premiums and analyzes the decisions of different types of power generators participating in the electricity market and the carbon trading market. Firstly, based on the different stages of power generators’ participation in the carbon-electricity market supply, this article constructs a premium subsidy model and divides it into three scenarios to verify the validity of the premium subsidy model and observe the decisions of power generators in different social electricity consumption scenarios. Then, in accordance with the process of power generators’ participation in the carbon-electricity market transactions, a decision-making model based on premium subsidies is constructed to reflect the impact of the premium subsidy model on the electricity system and the decision-making of power generators. The calculation example results conduct an analysis of power generation volume, carbon emissions, the total amount of premium subsidies,