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论康德对理性心理学的批判与转化
On Kant’s Critique and Transformation of Rational Psychology

DOI: 10.12677/acpp.2025.142062, PP. 78-87

Keywords: 理论,实践,理性心理学,自我,灵魂不朽,本体论
Theory
, Practice, Rational Psychology, Self, Soul Immortality, Ontology

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Abstract:

实践理性优于理论理性的理路体现在康德对理性心理学的批判与转化中。康德对理性心理学的批判体现在:在思辨理性的范围内,理性心理学围绕自我形成的超验判断都不具备有效性。康德对理性心理学的转化体现为:立足于实践,理性就可以在纯粹道德实践的前提下将理性心理学的超验规定信其为真,而这一转化的前提是康德所做出的实践理性对自我的本体论承诺,即不可直观的自在之我在实践中是可规定性。在理论理性的范围内,批判哲学否定了理性心理学命题的知识性,但在实践理性的视域内,批判哲学又以道德律为根据肯定人们可以坚信灵魂不朽。
The superiority of practical reason over theoretical reason is deeply reflected in Kant’s critique and transformation of rational psychology. Kant’s critique of rational psychology is reflected in the fact that none of the transcendental judgments of rational psychology surrounding the formation of the ego have validity within the scope of speculative rationality. Kant’s transformation of rational psychology is reflected in the fact that, as long as it is grounded in practice, reason can believe in the transcendental prescriptions of rational psychology in the context of purely moral practice and this transformation is made possible by the ontological commitment of practical reason to the self that Kant makes, i.e., the commitment that the unintuitive self in itself is prescriptible in practice. Within the scope of theoretical rationality, critical philosophy denies the knowledgeability of rational psychology propositions. However, but within the perspective of practical reason, critical philosophy affirms on the basis of the moral law that one can have a firm belief in the immortality of the soul.

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