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Natural Bioeconomic Exchange Contracts: Intelligence, Efficiency and Failures

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2025.151008, PP. 133-149

Keywords: Economic and Bioeconomic Equilibriums, Maximizing Utility and Well-Being, Organism Dysfunction, Consumer, Risks

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Abstract:

Human living cells need certain nutrients derived from certain foods that humans should contribute to their eating habits. These habits have very important economic consequences, thus deserving the examination of new lines of research by researchers. Economic equilibrium and bioeconomic equilibriums are the only effective equilibrium that maximize the well-being of individuals: satisfaction and health in the consumption of food. Any equilibrium deviating from these two equilibria is ineffective. Shortages in the consumption of food could cause dissatisfaction to the consumer and certainly cause his organism to malfunction. However, excess consumption beyond the optimal quantity known as normal represents a waste of resources and could decrease consumer satisfaction and even become toxic to the body. Man should thus have precise information on the types of food and their optimal quantities corresponding to such or such optimal quantities of nutrients essential for the proper functioning of his organism in order to avoid falling into shortages or excess for the nourishment of his body. The results of this study show too that risk-averse and risk-loving consumers are those who maximize the total expected utility the most in situations of imperfect information on the attributes of food goods to the proper functioning of the body. In the context of the analysis of the bioeconomic natural contract, the risk-loving consumer is the one who generates a lot of waste of food goods by seeking to maximize his utility or satisfaction in the consumption of food goods to satisfy the needs of the 100 million cells.

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