非对称信息下考虑政府补贴的供应链策略研究
Research on Supply Chain Strategies Considering Government Subsidies under Asymmetric Information

本研究探讨了制造商通过直销渠道销售产品(制造商入侵)对供应链的影响。相较于零售商竞争，供应商入侵现象研究较少。现有研究表明，在信息对称的供应链中，制造商入侵可缓解双重边际化效应，实现共赢。本文在制造商入侵框架下引入信息不对称因素，分析政府补贴、市场规模信息差异及制造商的可持续努力对供应链的影响。研究发现，在信息不对称情况下，制造商试图通过零售商订单推断市场规模，而零售商可能为私利调整订单，引发策略性博弈，降低供应链效率。特别是零售商为低类型时，可能通过扭曲订单量传递信号，加剧双重边际化。此外，研究发现直销效率并非越高越好，政府补贴也不一定能激励零售商增加订单量。本研究为理解制造商入侵在信息不对称供应链中的影响提供了新的视角。
This study investigates the impact of manufacturers selling products directly to consumers through direct channels, a phenomenon known as “manufacturer encroachment”. Compared to the competition among retailers, the phenomenon of supplier encroachment has received relatively less attention. Existing research indicates that under symmetric information structures in supply chains, manufacturer encroachment can alleviate double marginalization effects, leading to a win-win situation. Building on the theoretical framework of manufacturer encroachment and introducing asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the impact of government subsidies, differences in market size information, and the manufacturer’s sustainable efforts on the supply chain. Research has found that in situations of information asymmetry, manufacturers attempt to infer market size through retailer orders, while retailers may adjust orders for personal gain, triggering strategic games and reducing supply chain efficiency. Especially when retailers are of low type, they may distort order volume to transmit signals and exacerbate double marginalization. In addition, research has found that the higher the efficiency of direct sales, the better, and government subsidies may not necessarily incentivize retailers to increase order volume. This study provides a new perspective for understanding the impact of manufacturer intrusion in information asymmetric supply chains.