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Truth as Normative Power

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2025.151002, PP. 6-18

Keywords: Correspondence, Justification, Regulative Ideas, Cautionary Usage, Normative Power

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Abstract:

Ever since Aristotle proposed the definition of truth, people have not stopped discerning the concept of truth. Different from the traditional correspondence theory of truth, the modern understanding of the concept of truth emphasizes the role of justification. In the context of pragmatism, Bernstein agrees with the role of justification in understanding truth and appreciates Rorty’s cautionary usage of truth to advance the work of understanding truth, but at the same time, proposes that the concept of truth contains the dimension of normative power, and it is this dimension that allows truth to avoid both metaphysical accusations and relativist reproaches while retaining the positive meaning of justification. From the correspondence theory of truth to the regulative ideal, to the cautionary usage, and finally, to the normative power, people continue to deepen their understanding of the concept of truth by means of criticism of criticism.

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