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Finance 2025
恶意并购动因及经济后果分析——以粤民投收购中国宝安为例
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Abstract:
恶意并购的发起方大多被视作非正义的一方,其强行并购的经济行为也常常受到被并购方的抵御。本文旨在通过研究粤民投恶意并购中国宝安的案例,从而对恶意并购能有一个更全面的了解,研究发现恶意并购在短期内能够提升市场信心,优质资产的注入在一定程度上优化企业资产结构,从长期财务绩效分析来看则是负面影响为主,多项财务指标在并购事件发生后三年内都出现不同程度下降,同时恶意并购带来企业管理权的争夺也不利于企业持续健康发展,因此应当进一步规范市场秩序,完善相关制度法规,防范恶意并购事件的发生。
Most of the initiators of hostile mergers and acquisitions are regarded as unjust parties, and their economic behavior of forced mergers and acquisitions is often resisted by the target party. The purpose of this paper is to have a more comprehensive understanding of the hostile mergers and acquisitions of China Bao’an by studying the case of the hostile mergers and acquisitions of China Bao’an, and the research finds that the hostile mergers and acquisitions can enhance market confidence in the short term, and the injection of high-quality assets optimizes the asset structure of enterprises to a certain extent, and from the perspective of long-term financial performance analysis, the negative impact is the main, and a number of financial indicators have declined to varying degrees within three years after the occurrence of the mergers and acquisitions, and the competition for corporate management rights brought about by the malicious mergers and acquisitions is not conducive to the sustainable and healthy development of enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to further regulate the market order, improve relevant systems and regulations, and prevent the occurrence of malicious mergers and acquisitions.
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