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Modern Management 2024
公共建筑绿色改造项目关键阶段监管
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Abstract:
在公共建筑绿色改造项目中,政府委托ESCO进行能源管理,但ESCO可能牺牲节能效率谋利。本文基于委托代理理论,分析政府与ESCO的行为策略,提出以下措施减少ESCO机会主义行为:1) 提高能源服务费或加强监管以激励ESCO绿色改造;2) 提升服务费以增强设施维护;3) 设置高额奖惩机制保障节能设备质量,但可能增加业主费用;4) 合理设定服务费和奖惩系数以促进高效节能。研究有助于政府激励ESCO提高设备寿命和能源效率。
In public building green renovation projects, the government entrusts Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) with energy management, but ESCOs may sacrifice energy-saving efficiency for profit. Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the behavioral strategies between the government and ESCOs and proposes the following measures to reduce ESCO opportunistic behavior: 1) Increase energy service fees or strengthen supervision to incentivize ESCOs for green renovations; 2) Raise service fees to enhance facility maintenance efforts; 3) Establish a high reward and penalty mechanism to ensure the quality of energy-saving equipment, which may, however, increase the costs for building owners; 4) Reasonably set service fees and reward-penalty coefficients to promote efficient energy-saving measures. The research aids the government in motivating ESCOs to extend equipment lifespan and improve energy efficiency.
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