他人、朋友与他者——列维纳斯自我认知理论的超越性及其现实省思
Other People, Friends, and the Other—Transcendence of Levinas’ Theory on Self-Cognition and Its Reality Reflection

在《阿尔喀比亚德》中，柏拉图借“镜子比喻”引出了自我认知的概念以及具体认知过程。自我认知是通过“他人之眼”的反映而获得的关于灵魂、神圣的知识。亚里士多德在《优台谟伦理学》中将“镜子”比喻中的他人细化为“朋友”，在朋友对我的情感中，自身的善得以显现。无论是柏拉图还是亚里士多德，都肯定把他人作为自我认知显现的重要途径，却忽视了他人、朋友的主动性。而列维纳斯主张在自我认知过程中应该对他者给予关照和尊重，以凸显“他者”的方式超越了传统同一化的认识论方法。但同时列维纳斯的他者理论也暗含了以他者为标准的自我认知与建构倾向，可能导致自我认知与构建的现实困境。
In the Alcibiades, Plato used the “mirror metaphor” to introduce the concept of self-cognition and the specific cognitive process. Self-cognition is the knowledge of the soul, of the divine, gained through the reflection of the “other people’s eyes”. Aristotle, in the Eudemian Ethics, refined other people in the metaphor of the mirror to be the “friend”, and in the emotions that a friend has for me, my own goodness is revealed. Both Plato and Aristotle affirmed the importance of other people as a means of self-cognition manifestation, but they overlooked the initiative of other people and friends. Levinas, on the other hand, advocates that in the process of self-cognition, care, and respect should be given to “The Other”, which transcends the traditional epistemological approach of homogenization by highlighting “The Other”. But at the same time, Levinas’s theory of “The Other” also implies the tendency of self-cognition and construction based on the standard of “The Other”, which may lead to the practical dilemma of self-cognition and construction.