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Side-Channel Attacks & Data Exfiltration Using Wall Outlet USB Power Adapters

DOI: 10.4236/jis.2024.154025, PP. 433-447

Keywords: Cybersecurity, Side Channel Attack, Power Line Communication, Penetration Testing, Hotplug Attack Tool

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Abstract:

The number and creativity of side channel attacks have increased dramatically in recent years. Of particular interest are attacks leveraging power line communication to 1) gather information on power consumption from the victim and 2) exfiltrate data from compromised machines. Attack strategies of this nature on the greater power grid and building infrastructure levels have been shown to be a serious threat. This project further explores this concept of a novel attack vector by creating a new type of penetration testing tool: an USB power adapter capable of remote monitoring of device power consumption and communicating through powerline communications.

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